The folly of LRH’s “Intelligence Principles”

Note: I’m welcoming the first outside contributor to this blog: Jeff Wasel, a Ph.D. with significant professional and academic expertise in financial crime, money laundering, who’s a retired military intelligence, to boot.  I’ve enjoyed talking with him and I welcome him to this forum.

Take it away, Jeff!  


Recently, Mike Rinder posted an article on his site about the sexual assault accusations lodged against former Scientologist Paul Haggis.

Haggis has said that the Church of Scientology may be involved in these claims, attempting to smear him after his 2008 defection from the church spawned a classic New Yorker magazine article, the award-winning book by Larry Wright, “Going Clear: Scientology and the Prison of Belief,” and an Emmy-winning/Oscar-nominated HBO documentary of the same name from Alex Gibney.  The cascade of bad press stemming from Haggis’s defection has significantly undermined Scientology’s brand name and thus its ability to recruit new members.

In the article, Rinder published Hubbard’s policy documents outlining strategies for smearing opponents, which Hubbard calls “intelligence principles.”

A lot of people have repeated without thinking the claim that Hubbard was into “intelligence operations,” when all he was merely running a series of smear campaigns.

Having spent 13 years in the Marine Corps, in a variety of billets, including 4 years of which were as an intelligence analyst, I want to show you just how far Hubbard’s goon squad and dirty tricks organization is from a professional intelligence operation.

The Scientology Goon Squad

Hubbard wasn’t doing “intelligence gathering,” and OSA is hardly an omnipotent “intelligence organization.”

In his typically turgid style, Hubbard’s many policy letters on the subject are basically a Hollywood pulp writer’s fantasies about how intelligence organizations really run. Those policy letters are simply a list of cheap tactics to ruin reputations, and nothing more than roadmaps for “fair gaming,” if you will.

Hubbard’s tactics, no matter how lavishly funded or imaginatively devised, lack any of the sophistication and strategic thought that drives a legitimate intelligence organization. This has led to the current state of ineptitude in OSA, resulting in numerous past failures, and more recently, evidence of increasingly incompetent operations.

Operation “Snow White” definitely involved impressive tradecraft in the way that Scientology infiltrated various US government offices and gathered a broad range of sensitive information. But on the whole, it was just a very sophisticated burglary. The Guardian’s organization (GO) utterly failed in the most important part of the intelligence process: exploiting the information obtained. And it failed to prevent the extraordinary blowback when the scheme was discovered, blowback which ultimately almost fatally crippled Scientology at the time. Scientology’s tainted reputation began to accumulate in the wake of the failure of “Operation Snow White,” and continues to cripple Scientology to the present day.

Of course, legitimate espionage organizations occasionally dip into the “black arts” when ruining the reputation of a target, blackmailing them or otherwise discrediting or eliminating them and neutralizing their influence.

For instance, the decades-long Scientology campaign against Paulette Cooper, writer of the first exposé of the cult, is a textbook example. However, this campaign, ably documented in Tony Ortega’s book [link] “The Unbreakable Miss Lovely,” failed to silence Paulette, who remains an opponent to this day.

More importantly, the plot failed to advance the organization’s primary goals, which is the ultimate raison d’être of any professional intelligence effort. Once the scheme was uncovered, it exposed Scientology once again as a sinister, paranoid and ultimately untrustworthy cult, devoid of any moral or ethical foundation. That’s hardly the best way to protect and enhance their brand, let alone expedite planetary clearing.

What Real Intelligence Organizations Do & How They Do It

A real intelligence organization has mastery over the entire intelligence cycle: the targeted collection of information (raw data), the transformation of that raw data into intelligence, interpretation of the intelligence, and dissemination to the correct people in a timely manner so they can take effective action to forward the national strategy. The cycle is completed when feedback from the action is used to improve the intelligence process.

Hubbard is lost in a series of niche tactics, and has utterly lost sight of the end goal of a strategic intelligence campaign.

In Hubbard’s case, the lack of adherence to a formal process creates strategies for the group based on guesswork. In Scientology’s case, the “strategy” is essentially to destroy someone, simply as an expression of spite, malice and revenge.

True intelligence professionals would never ignore the time needed for thoughtful analytical processing and would work diligently to ensure that the action chosen in response to the analysis actually forwards the organization’s goals.

Interestingly, one consequence of Scientology’s flawed methods is that they can’t even identify “potential trouble sources” (PTS’s) in their own organization. That is, they now have so many defectors from their dirty tricks squad that exposure is frequent. Stories about these defections can be found on Tony Ortega’s and Mike Rinder’s blogs, here and here.

The internal organizational structure significantly harms Scientology’s ability to acquire and position infiltrators and sources for PR campaigns, thus paving the way for intelligence failures, or exposure of their ham-handed methods.

To show you just how flawed and inept Hubbard’s intelligence vision is, I’m providing a list of intelligence·principles utilized by intelligence· professionals across a variety of agencies; they are not listed in any particular order:

Planning: rigorous, methodical planning ensures that agencies collect all the information they need, and then process and deliver it appropriately, all in the timeframe required by decision-makers. Planning ensures that intelligence delivered (the “product”) meets user requirements. You’ve probably heard the 5 P’s before: proper planning prevents poor·performance. Any intelligence professional would consider the 5 Ps an important maxim for their job.

Exploitation of all sources: you must use a variety of different sources to ensure that you’re getting the information you need, to form an objective, multi-sourced foundation for successful and effective action. Sole-source dependence often results in confirmation bias, which can be disastrous.

A significant ongoing concern for intelligence professionals is a source being compromised or countered. An obvious example is when a satellite pass over a target is blocked, or countered, by clouds. A much trickier and far more dangerous example is when a human intelligence asset (a spy) has either been turned by the opposition and is feeding you bogus data, or has been eliminated altogether.

Real-world intelligence professionals often must work with multiple agencies to get a complete picture· from different sources. Some agencies have specific skill sets or resources that are unique to a specific requirement as an example. There are 17 different intelligence· agencies in the US, each with its own mission, but many have information that would help each other, thus coordination is as important as collection. Clearly, Scientology does not need to worry about this, but they must worry about the opposite problem: too much reliance on a single source, often resulting in rampant confirmation bias.

National agencies look at a broad variety of intelligence from multiple sources: TECHINT from intercepted and decrypted e-mail and similar sources, SIGINT from radio communications, SATINT from satellites, as well as the millennia-old use of HUMINT, or human intelligence sources. Judgement and experience are necessary, in understanding how each of these sources can be fooled, either by deceptions laid by the opposition or by sloppy thinking, as well how they can best be exploited within the intelligence process.

Time: there’s an old saying about how “time spent on planning is never wasted.” Professionals use this saying to motivate planners and analysts to be “forward-looking and forward thinking.” You always need to be anticipating the next threat, regardless of how remote it may seem, and not simply focusing on detecting the last one. Warfare and conflict are constantly evolving, so strategies and methods, as guided by an effective and adaptable intelligence process, must evolve as well, as they are the keys to survival.

A key example of this is the invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 2001 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks. Rather than using conventional infantry, the US deployed Special Forces, in league with their Northern Alliance allies, and routed the Taliban using guerilla and light mobile strike force tactics. Contrast this with Iraq, where the US military, well-schooled in fighting large-scale wars against organized military forces, initially triumphed against Iraq’s conventional forces. Having disbanded the original army, it now faced a raging insurgency as a result, one that would take 4 years to quell, through the use of classic counter-insurgency, rather than the traditional infantry tactics used to conquer Saddam’s army. Intelligence triumphed in the former, and while accurate in the later, was ignored by policy makers, resulting in unnecessary losses in blood and treasure.

Scientology has proven to be a colossal failure at harnessing time and forward-looking thinking, as well as the ability to adapt strategically. They are stuck in a 1950’s playbook, written by a man whose strategic thinking appears to be stuck in 1930’s pulp detective novels.

When you master time, you ensure that you can deliver on the following specific and concrete requirements for successful intelligence, and that you can then translate that intelligence into successful actions that propel a successful strategy:

  • Planning: Yes, some of Scientology’s dirty tricks campaigns have been elaborately staged, but I’m talking about the planning process itself; not only in the field, but also for the whole lifecycle of a project, ensuring it actually forwards the organization’s goals.
  • Identify, recruit and train covert sources (agents): universities, one’s opposition, or other source well-positioned, based on need. Then decide who to position and where; for instance an embassy, or a covert resource in a defense contractor.
  • Tasking of covert and overt sources (i.e., what to collect): imagery (covert photography, satellite imagery); culling commercial trade journals, mass-media sources, etc. Use of wiretaps or covert surveillance.
  • Deployment and/or positioning of TECHINT and SATINT sources: While Scientology doesn’t have its own satellite networks, (even if OSA operatives think that they can simply “go exterior”), Scientology has, in some cases, been able to successfully deploy TECHINT. For instance, they intercepted Pat Broeker’s cordless phone conversations years ago.
  • Collection of information: A rational plan for organizing sources, including overt, covert, commercial and open source information.
  • The feedback/reporting process: this defines how raw data is assessed as to its accuracy and validity, then how it’s effectively routed, and how it’s finally exploited by an end-user.
  • Interpretation: what the data says, and where it can be most usefully exploited.
  • Disseminating the intelligence product: who needs to see what, then where, and in what time frame.
  • Relevancy: this step ensures collection of all the data relevant to the intelligence· requirement, but only that data. And you must apply consistent, rational principles to determine relevancy; not whim, caprice, or vengeance.

Even when you have tons of free slave labor and unlimited budgets, you need to use your resources efficiently. You can’t just collect everything that might be conceivably useful, because that wastes money, time, and effort, and adversely impacting morale, because the staff knows they are pouring their hearts into creating product that will either never be used or that will lead to inconsequential results.

The problem is that collecting and analyzing too much irrelevant data, leads to a logjam at the management level, as decision-makers are either paralyzed with too much information, (paralysis by analysis), or are distracted with too much irrelevancy, resulting in poor decision making.

Control/Access: you have to control the collection effort. This means making sure that you don’t inadvertently manipulate raw data, as well as preventing duplication of effort, and also to ensure that your sources aren’t compromised, through enemy action, poor organizational tradecraft or simple individual incompetence. If your sources are caught, as they increasingly frequently are in the case of Scientology’s dirty tricksters, it causes damage far beyond that of a poorly executed intelligence operation. Without access, there can be no collection. Access needs to be well-planned in advance with backup access points in position in case sources are compromised. Controlling access involves administrative measures such as security clearances, physical access restraints such as Secure Compartmentalized Facilities and organizational structures such as the famous “need to know basis.”

Flexibility: adaptability in the collection process is vitally important as circumstances warrant; a nimble decision loop for choosing among potential targets ensures a higher probability of success. That doesn’t mean that you devolve your collection program into ad hoc-driven chaos; rather, that you’re planning doesn’t become ironclad, biased, or incomplete, when opportunities to evolve or adapt present themselves.

For instance, Scientology’s default “go-to” strategy is the “noisy operation,” wherein its operatives ensure a target is well aware of their attentions, along with the target’s neighbors or fellow employees. However, given the vast amount of personal video and sound recording technology available to a potential target, as a means to document Scientology harassment, church operatives persist in using aggressive surveillance tactics that inevitably result in embarrassing and compromising evidence of the church’s excesses being viewed all across cyberspace.

The same occurs with the tired tactic of “dead agent” packs, wherein the church assembles supposedly compromising data on a target, and delivers it to an organization or individual that somehow is expected to take action detrimental to the target. Given that the data enclosed is bias towards the church’s agenda, and is usually flimsy with the truth, it’s veracity is easily debunked by a simple web search. Yet dead agenting continues to be an ongoing “intelligence principle.”

The Goon Squad Proves Hubbard Was Never a Real Intelligence Operative

In closing, people running intelligence operations need to be mindful of many things: the grand strategy of the organization (what they are trying to accomplish over the long-term), the tactical strategy at the street level, where the general approach that the intelligence organization uses to support the goals of the particular intelligence program and ultimately, the grand strategy of the organization must be defined to encompass both levels of execution.

Hubbard’s ramblings show he never had a clue about how a real intelligence organization operated. These principles were certainly laid down by the time of the second world war, when the modern CIA sprung out of the wartime Office of Special Services. Hubbard’s cluelessness about the intelligence process shows that he was never remotely close to being a senior intelligence official as Scientology insisted, and has attempted to prove with bizarre, concocted letters from conspiracy theorists pretending to be mainstream experts. (I’m referring to the letter from Fletcher Prouty, claiming that Hubbard’s military record was “sheep dipped” with false details to throw people off from realizing just how important an intelligence asset he was).

Conclusions

Had Hubbard actually built a competent intelligence· organization, instead of an increasingly inept gang of thugs and dirty tricksters as the OSA is today, one can only wonder how it would have helped advance Scientology’s goals of world conquest.

Megalomania is fatal in the intelligence business. Analysts, assets, and operatives must be able to objectively and rationally apply their craft unlabored by hidden agendas. They need to be· efficient, accurate, and well-led, all things that Scientology is not.


Eeben Barlow’s MILSEC blog was used as a source in preparing this post.

 

  • ron_burgundy8957

    I wouldn’t necessarily fault Scientology for being unprofessional or unskilled with their intelligence operations. Instead, I would look at the product they are offering in exchange. Sure, the United States has access to equipment and people that Scientology no doubt will be unable to get their hands on, at least in the near future. And yes, they love to publically display their smear packets and whatnot that push the limits of our nation’s defamation and privacy laws. But this is just the tip of the spear. We know, for example, the Scientology is involved with helping police departments solve crimes.

    They also have access to years of unfiltered statements derived from auditing and sec checks, information that, if properly analyzed in bulk, would likely reveal some incredible trends or insights. Further, as Mike Rinder’s blog pointed out, they may simply be trying to push someone in a specific direction.

    https://www.mikerindersblog.org/framing-whistleblowers-the-scientology-playbook/

    If you recall John Sweeney’s famous interview with Tommy Davis, they were fairly effective at pushing his buttons and swaying certain viewers.

    Also, we have to examine the aims of the organization. US Intelligence supports American objectives, that, sadly, change rather quickly. One need only look at the way the Middle East wars have been handled by three presidents to get a glimpse of that reality. Amazingly, we still have barely made a dent, at least in terms of restoring those countries to what they looked like in the past despite all the time and wasted money and blood shed.

    When it comes to the objectives of OSA, a large portion of that would be to create fear. In that regard, I would argue they are somewhat successful. Take for instance the number of people who are “under the radar” Scientologists, too afraid to speak out for fear of reprisal. Even the protestors adopt a somewhat packlike mentality that shows strength and support to each other, leading Marty Rathbun to brand “anti-Scientologists” a cult.

    And amazingly, the United States Government continues to show the cult support through both action and communication. They still are not shut down to this day, and it looks like Trout Run may be making a comeback.

    https://www.facebook.com/groups/NoNarcononTroutRun/

    They’re “OPSEC,” if you will, is also quite exemplary ranging from carefully staged phonecalls on pay phones to cutting off family members who don’t quite tow the line.

    My conclusion remains that they are a well organized threat and should never be taken lightly. However, their product is absolute crap that the “market,” if you will, is sorting out rather nicely.

    • Jeff Wasel Ph.D

      Hi “Ron”, thanks for your thoughtful responses to my post. Here’s my take on your observations and responses:

      I wouldn’t necessarily fault Scientology for being unprofessional or unskilled with their intelligence operations.

      I must respectfully disagree that they’re engaged in intelligence operations, given what those entail. Some of the behavior they engage in, is certainly undertaken in part by intelligence organizations as germane to the collection process. Theses include a variety of surveillance tactics, techniques & procedures (TTP), some of which are better suited to resources engaged in espionage, such as their smear operations (“SmearOps”, traditionally referred to as psychological operations or PsyOps); however, even though they may demonstrate a modicum of competence in these specific areas, a piecemeal approach does not a professional intelligence organization make.

      Instead, I would look at the product they are offering in exchange. Sure, the United States has access to equipment and people that Scientology no doubt will be unable to get their hands on, at least in the near future. And yes, they love to publicly display their smear packets and whatnot that push the limits of our nation’s defamation and privacy laws. But this is just the tip of the spear. We know, for example, the Scientology is involved with helping police departments solve crimes.

      In intelligence terms, “product” is the end result of the intelligence process. It can take a variety of forms, such as a newly turned enemy operative, decoded message traffic, or other useful information that ultimately includes the bundled analysis and recommended course of action that originates from the raw data sourced through these diverse means.

      While the resources of the US are indeed formidable, quality intelligence can be obtained through quite unsophisticated, yet highly effective methods and sources, those human-centric in particular (HUMINT). Within this realm, surveillance and behavioral analysis and exploitation comprise the main focus of an intelligence organization’s efforts. Given Scientology’s predilection for doings things on the cheap, this is where it conducts much of it’s information gathering, dead avenging, smear campaigns, and black bag capers, either by proxy (using PIs and such), or SO members. More so, “cheap” is relative, in that Scn’s OSA spends huge sums for little return, in terms of what you label as “exchange”, and I would term viable “product”.

      Assisting law enforcement, while appearing altruistic or community-minded, is more often than not a self-serving exercise. As a security-related function, Gold’s security force reporting trespassers to the Riverside Sheriff’s Office has nothing to do with any professional intelligence function. While the actions of Gold’s security team may construe surveillance, observation, or the review of security camera and sensor data, this is really only raw data collection. It may go into a database of “known SPs”, protestors, or other perceived threats. However, until that data undergoes some analysis, or is incorporated into some plan of action that furthers Scn in some way, it’s irrelevant to any supposed intelligence process.

      They also have access to years of unfiltered statements derived from auditing and sec checks, information that, if properly analyzed in bulk, would likely reveal some incredible trends or insights. Further, as Mike Rinder’s blog pointed out, they may simply be trying to push someone in a specific direction. (https://www.mikerindersblog)
      It’s important to realize what entails a useful data set, rather than simply hoarding raw, unstructured or unanalyzed data or information. While PC folders may hold a wealth of highly personal data, data than can certainly be used to coerce someone into a particular course of action, any aggregation and analysis would only uncover specific human behavioral trends, and very little that could truly advance Scn as an organization.

      For instance, those folders are laden with sexual peccadilloes, and all sorts of raw, emotive, confessional-type data. But is any of it really “actionable”, outside of use in coercion or black mail? More so, as auditing is usually the province of the truly indoctrinated, what more can be achieved through additional attempts at behavior modification? Furthermore, there limited leverage here, given that cash is eventually depleted, as is loyalty over time, thus do the ends indeed justify the means? More so, how does this lead to more clears and “massive” expansion?

      If you recall John Sweeney’s famous interview with Tommy Davis, they were fairly effective at pushing his buttons and swaying certain viewers.

      What we witnessed with Sweeny was again classic psychological warfare or PsyOps, at the tactical level, the level where Scn enjoys some success. PsyOps are a different form of warfare altogether, and in many instances, operate independently of the intelligence function. More so, harassment or reputational assaults of that sort rarely result in any beneficially strategic outcome, unless such methods are deliberately incorporated into a strategic campaign, inclusive of a variety of intelligence operations, PsyOps, information warfare or cyber operations.

      Also, we have to examine the aims of the organization. US Intelligence supports American objectives, that, sadly, change rather quickly. One need only look at the way the Middle East wars have been handled by three presidents to get a glimpse of that reality. Amazingly, we still have barely made a dent, at least in terms of restoring those countries to what they looked like in the past despite all the time and wasted money and blood shed.

      While several of the examples I used were based on past US intelligence operations, the principles of intelligence hold sway among intelligence organizations across the board, be they the CIA, Mossad, the Russian FSB, or Britain’s MI5/6. It’s also important to understand that policy failures are not necessarily indicative of intelligence failures. Often times hubris, endemic confirmation bias, or a lack of political will are the culprits more than lousy tradecraft, poor order of battle analysis, or a lack of timeliness.

      When it comes to the objectives of OSA, a large portion of that would be to create fear. In that regard, I would argue they are somewhat successful. Take for instance the number of people who are “under the radar” Scientologists, too afraid to speak out for fear of reprisal. Even the protestors adopt a somewhat packlike mentality that shows strength and support to each other, leading Marty Rathbun to brand “anti-Scientologists” a cult.

      I agree that OSA has developed a finely tuned intimidation and harassment apparatus, but “fear” is not intelligence product, and again, is more the realm of PsyOps. However, while successful in execution, the failure lies in furthering the goals of Scn. While UTRs may be fearful of speaking-out as a result of those same tactics, the public at large now realizes that fear and intimidation are engrained in Scn’s culture, thus crippling any chance at reputational redemption or organizational growth; how then, does that represent “success”?

      And amazingly, the United States Government continues to show the cult support through both action and communication. They still are not shut down to this day, and it looks like Trout Run may be making a comeback. (https://www.facebook.com/gr…)

      I would argue that alleging the US Government “continues to show the cult support” is a bit of a stretch. Long-established First Amendment constitutional protections, as well as the intricacies of the tax code are hardly ringing endorsements of Scn. Where Zi think we share common ground is in our frustration with lack of political will that frustrates any current hope of curbing not only Scn’s many abuses and liberties, but also those of a variety of new religious movements (NRMs), and other cults, as well as the abuse of the political process by large lobbying blocks such as the evangelical right.

      They’re “OPSEC,” if you will, is also quite exemplary ranging from carefully staged phonecalls on pay phones to cutting off family members who don’t quite tow the line.

      Their OpSec (operational-level security) and security tradecraft is certainly well honed, though it is as much the result of excessive compartmentalization and an almost obsessive use of “the need to know”, than any deliberate, repeatable process; this form of secrecy can then introduce its own unique set of limitations, through disrupting timely communication of the pooling of assets.

      I would describe the practice of disconnection as more a doctrinal repercussion than one of operational security or necessity. I would describe it as more a control mechanism in line with the use of PC folders as a tool of PsyOps, as means of behavior modification.

      My conclusion remains that they are a well organized threat and should never be taken lightly. However, their product is absolute crap that the “market,” if you will, is sorting out rather nicely.

      I would never take lightly, an organization that can devote some $225 million dollars towards PsyOps and dirty tricks, and I agree they are well-organized to some extent, though in pursuit of what end game? More so, to whom do they represent the greatest threat, if not themselves in many regards? My point in analyzing Hubbard’s use of “intelligence” was not that Scn has been completely neutered, more so, that their competences have been highly over-stated, and certainly mis-labeled and misappropriated. And I’m as delighted as you are, that their “product” is crap nonetheless!

      Rob, I appreciate your taking the time to offer your insights on my post, and welcome your thoughts as to my response.

      • ron_burgundy8957

        Hello Dr. Wasel,

        Thank you for responding to “Ron’s” long post. I shudder to use the name at times due to Scientology’s litigious nature but feel the concept of having an overly masculine traditionally American news reporter is a voice that needs to be a part of the discussion. I also don’t think Will Farrell will think this is a violation of fair use, and I generally write in my own “voice.”

        I see where you are coming from in looking at the somewhat scholarly framework (top down, strategic planning) that the American intelligence community is depicted (and how consultants they likely pay large sums of money to write the TTPs they use also want them to come across 🙂 ). I just can’t bring myself to agree that they represent the hallmark of how to do business, especially when things are put into practice, and of course, I don’t agree that Scientology is either.

        Setting that aside, I tend to say that their overall aim is to “clear the planet.” It recently occurred to me that’s a very cute way of saying sell counseling services that are really nothing more than mental and possibly spiritual exercises (depending on your level of belief). In this regard, OSA helps them to eliminate potential competitive barriers, whether that be SPs (critics), the evil psychs (other forms of therapy), or the Illuminati (key government or industry players). However, their high costs, relative to comparable, if not better alternatives (just being generous to them) along with the internet is readily making that difficult. It is a testament to their skills that they remain afloat to this day and to a certain speaks to the effectiveness of how they do what they do.

        Just a few points on your post to add some insight…

        1-I’m not sure exactly what they’re doing with local law enforcement. From what the deputy said, it appears to be more than just reporting Donald Myers when he goes batshit crazy on them.

        2-Long standing religious freedoms is a difficult point to make and something I’ve posted on. I’ve heard some Constitutional Scholars state there is almost nothing guaranteed in the Constitution, and the judiciary has a long history of activism that the well paid attorneys employed by OSA take advantage of (at least that’s my understanding of the fee structure).

        Also, the intel gained, while it may show some insight into human behavior might also trends or corporate secrets that a Google search or even a private intelligence firm might not be able to uncover.

        Just my thoughts,

        -RB

      • FYI, an easy way to make these long posts more readable in the future is to enclose quotes from the previous poster in a “

        ” tag (you need to take out the spaces. At the end of the quote, use a “

        ” tag (again, take out the spaces). The “blockquote” HTML tag will stylize it so it’s clear what you’re responding to.

  • otviii2late

    Another great article–and comments. I am really appreciating the educational element you’ve built into the past couple of articles. It’s fast becoming a John P. Capitalist trademark.

    • The credit for the “educational element” on this post goes entirely to Dr. Wasel. I fixed a couple of semicolons on this one. I’m fortunate to have found another data wonk/research fiend to contribute here.